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US-CHINA TRADE IMBALANCE: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE CURRENCY MANIPULATION 
Joshua Brown* 
 
 
Abstract 
This article presumes that Chinese currency manipulation has a 
negative impact on world markets, in particular the United States, and 
explores potential remedies available to U.S. policy makers. First, the 
history of China’s currency manipulation leading up to the present day 
will be examined. Then, four potential remedies to Chinese currency 
manipulation will be discussed in turn, including: (1) the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in effect under the WTO framework; (2) 
the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement; (3) the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988; and (4) the Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011. 
While the Congressional Acts discussed offer plausible mechanisms 
by which the United States could confront China’s undervaluation of its 
currency, the effectiveness of such acts is inherently limited by their 
unilateral nature. On the other hand, the added leverage provided 
through the multilateral approach (i.e., the International Monetary 
fund), in which the United States acts in conjunction with other countries 
that are also negatively affected by China’s currency undervaluation, 
seems the more promising solution. This solution could be achieved 
through the “Geneva Consensus,” by which the World Trade 
Organization, with the International Monetary Fund’s guidance, would 
exert pressure on China to bear the burden of adjustment by recycling its 
surplus to deficit countries, including the United States. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Amid the backdrop of deepening economic contraction, many figures 
within the United States have called for increased scrutiny of China’s 
currency regime.
1
 As of this writing, the United States, having endured a 
                                                     
*J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, 2013; B.A. International Studies, 
University of California, Irvine, 2004. Mr. Brown would like to thank Professor Timothy A. Canova 
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1 See Economists Agree: China’s Currency Manipulation Contributes to U.S. Jobs Crisis, 
UNITED STATES_SENATE_DEMOCRATS_(Oct._4,_2011,_11:05_AM), http://democrats.senate.gov/ 
2011/10/04/economists-agree-china%E2%80%99s-currency-manipulation-contributes-to-u-s-jobs-
crisis/ (quoting several former governmental officials and economists who all agree that China is 
engaging in currency manipulation). 
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deep recession just two years prior, appears headed into yet another 
recession.
2
 The number of unemployed persons remained at 14.0 million 
and the unemployment rate held at 9.1%.
3
 According to CBS News, 
“there are nearly 25 million Americans who are either out of work or 
working part-time,” wages remain stagnate, the housing market is still in 
the tank, and the credit binge has resulted in a bad hangover phase for the 
economy.
4
 The employment situation is so dire that a small protest 
addressing this issue recently started in a small park in New York City 
and transformed into an international social movement, spreading across 
the country and around the world.
5
 
China’s practice of currency manipulation may be one of the reasons 
that the U.S. economy has failed thus far to recover. Many assert that 
China manipulates its currency in order to promote growth of its exports 
while protecting domestic industries from international competition.
6
 
Such undervaluation keeps the prices of Chinese goods low and the 
prices of foreign goods out of reach of the Chinese consumer.
7
 It is thus 
argued that this undervaluation grants Chinese exporters an unfair and 
artificial trading advantage, producing negative effects on both the U.S. 
economy and the global trading system.
8
 Consequently, an undervalued 
Chinese currency, among other things, led to a U.S. trade deficit with 
China of $226.8 billion in 2009, $273 billion in 2010, and $295.4 billion 
in 2011.
9
 Because the trade deficit has continued to grow, China’s 
currency manipulation must be addressed with urgency; doing so could 
potentially strengthen the U.S. economy by reducing its unhealthy 
dependence on Chinese imports.   
                                                     
2  See US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last modified Oct. 1, 2012) (tracking U.S. business cycles from 
December 1854 through June 2009); see also Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Economists see new 
recession_increasingly_likely,_REUTERS_(Oct._4,_2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/ 
04/us-usa-economy-recession-idUSTRE7936QK20111004 (reporting on the increasing likelihood of 
a new U.S. recession).  
3 Employment Situation Summary: The Employment Situation – August 2011, U.S. BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_09022011.htm 
(reporting on various U.S. economic data for the month of August 2011). 
4 Jill Schlesinger, Are We Headed for Another Recession?, CBS MONEY WATCH (Aug. 19, 
2011, 10:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-38044892/are-we-headed-for-
another-recession/ (reporting on the current recession-like U.S. economy, giving tips to individuals 
on how to deal with the current economic malaise, and noting that, as of the writing of the article, 
corporations had exited the “hangover phase,” and continued to rack up profits, while 25 million 
Americans are either out of work or working part-time).  
5 See Henry Blodget, CHARTS: Here’s What the Wall Street Protestors Are So Angry About…, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 11, 2011, 1:03 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-wall-street-
protesters-are-so-angry-about-2011-10?op=1 (stating that the Occupy Wall Street protestors have 
legitimate gripes, given the current unemployment and wealth disparity situations in the U.S. and 
warning of an increasing de-stabilization within the U.S.).  
6 See Elizabeth L. Pettis, Is China’s Manipulation of its Currency an Actionable Violation of 
the IMF and/or the WTO Agreements?, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 281, 281 (2011). 
7 See id.  
8 See id. 
9Foreign Trade – Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (last visited Nov. 22 , 2012).   
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However, the exact effect of China’s currency regime on the U.S. 
economy, in particular its effect on U.S. jobs, is unclear. Some prominent 
figures reject the notion that a rise in the value of China’s currency 
would improve the U.S. job market.
10
 Still, researchers have shown that 
between 2001 and 2010, China’s currency manipulation was a major 
cause of the rapidly growing trade deficit with China, which in turn 
resulted in the elimination or displacement of 2.8 million jobs, 1.9 
million of which were in manufacturing.
11
 These losses account for 
“nearly half of all U.S. manufacturing jobs lost or displaced between 
China’s entry (in 2001) into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
2010.”12 
II.   CHINESE CURRENCY MANIPULATION 
A.   China’s Currency Exchange Regime 
China’s official currency is the renminbi (RMB), meaning “the 
people’s currency.” 13  RMB is not freely traded in the international 
currency market and is issued and controlled solely by the central bank 
of China, known as the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). 14  Experts 
believe that between 1994 and 2005, “China maintained a fixed 
exchange rate, or peg, of 8.28” RMB per U.S. dollar (USD).15 For many 
years, China did not need to take any action to keep the supply of RMB 
in line with demand, but as “demand for Chinese goods and services 
increased, more RMB were required to purchase those goods and 
services, resulting in an upward pressure on the value of the RMB.”16 To 
counter an appreciating RMB, the Chinese government, through the 
PBOC, began to increase “the supply of RMB and decrease the supply of 
another nation’s currency by purchasing that nation’s currency on the 
open currency market,” to maintain the 8.28 RMB per USD value of its 
                                                     
10 See Department of State Washington File: Greenspan Sees China’s Currency Peg Unrelated 
to U.S. Job Losses, AM. INST. OF TAIWAN (Dec. 11, 2003), http://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf-
archive/2003/031211/epf409.htm (reporting on U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s 
conclusion that an action by China to remove its fixed exchange rate policy and permit the RMB to 
appreciate, “would be unlikely to have much, if any, effect on aggregate employment in the United 
States”). 
11 Robert E. Scott, Growing U.S. Trade Deficit with China Cost 2.8 Million Jobs Between 2001 
and 2010, ECON. POLICY INST., Sept. 20, 2011, at 1.  
12 Id. 
13 Matt Phillips, Yuan or Renminbi: What’s the Right Word for China’s Currency?, WALL ST. 
J. (June 21, 2010, 4:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/06/21/yuan-or-renminbi-whats-
the-right-word-for-chinas-currency/. 
14 See Xinchen Sofia Lou, Challenging China’s Fixed Exchange Rate Regime: An Analysis of 
U.S. Options, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005). 
15 Paul V. Sharobeem, Biting the Hand that Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy 
Trends Concerning Chinese Currency Manipulation, 19 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 697, 697 (2007); see also 
Pettis, supra note 6, at 282. 
16 Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 698. 
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currency.
17
 As a result, in “2000 China had currency reserves of $165 
billion,” equivalent to 10% of their gross domestic product (GDP).18 By 
the end of 2009, China had currency reserves of $2.4 trillion, accounting 
for more than 50% of their annual GDP.” 19  More recently, China’s 
foreign exchange reserve purchases have reached unprecedented levels, 
with purchases of $728 billion between June 30, 2010 and June 30, 
2011.
20
 As of June 30, 2011, China held a total of $3.2 trillion in foreign 
exchange reserves, about 70% of which were held in U.S. denominated 
assets.
21
 Many of these purchases were of U.S. Treasury bonds and other 
foreign securities.
22
 According to some estimates, the Chinese 
government purchases about $1 billion daily in currency exchange 
markets to fight appreciation of the RMB, thereby maintaining “an 
artificially strong competitive advantage.”23  
The Chinese government has also employed strict capital controls to 
regulate the supply of RMB to combat appreciation.
24
 For example, in 
1996, China imposed stringent procedures for businesses and individuals 
to convert RMB to foreign currency, through its Rules on Foreign 
Exchange Control (Rules).
25
 The Rules implemented a prohibition on 
any pricing and settlement of accounts in foreign currency on “all 
individuals and businesses within China, including foreign exchange 
revenues and expenditures of foreign operations in China.”26 The Rules 
further required that all “foreign exchange earnings of China-based 1q 
qback into China and deposited in authorized foreign exchange banks.”27 
Furthermore, the government “required firms in China to exchange most 
of their hard currency earnings to the central government in exchange for 
RMB.”28 While China did eventually allow for the free convertibility of 
trade transactions, capital transactions remained under strict controls to 
avoid “unpredictable flows of capital into or out of the country.”29 
                                                     
17 Id.  
18 Nasos Mihalakas, Chinese Currency Manipulation, FOREIGN POL’Y ASS’N (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/01/11/chinese-currency-manipulation-%E2%80%93-explained-
by-expert-bloggers-and-funny-bears/ (explaining how China’s dollar peg limits U.S. recovery by 
overvaluing the dollar in key Asian markets and therefore artificially raising the price of U.S. 
exports and contributing to the dangerous overheating of China’s economy through inflows of “hot 
money”). 
19 Id. 
20 Scott, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
21 Id. at 5 (citing Chris Oliver, China forex reserves hit $3.2 trillion: PBOC, THE WALL ST. J. 
DIGITAL NETWORK (July 12, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-forex-reserves-hit-32-
trillion-pboc-2011-07-12). 
22 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 699. 
23 Mihalakas, supra note 18. 
24 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 698. 
25 See Lou, supra note 14, at 458. 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 698. 
29 Id.; see also Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the 
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1586 (1999) [hereinafter The Neoliberal 
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Due to increasing trade with the United States, a ballooning trade 
surplus with the United States, and pressure from its trading partners and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China announced in 2005 that it 
would implement a new hybrid exchange rate system.
30
 Under this 
system, regulation would allow the value of the RMB to appreciate from 
8.27 to 8.11 RMB/USD, a 2.1% increase.
31
 The new system would link 
the RMB to a “basket” of currencies, widely thought to be “the euro, yen, 
the U.S. dollar, as well as other Asian currencies.” 32 Lastly, the RMB 
would be allowed to fluctuate by 0.3% each day above or below a central 
parity, which was determined by “the closing price of . . . the U.S. dollar 
traded against the RMB . . . after the closing . . . of the market each 
working day.” 33  Most likely by intention, Chinese officials did not 
explain how the central parity was set. In effect, the closing price is fixed 
by the PBOC through its currency manipulation. The central parity 
merely refers back to its own price, allowing a 0.3% fluctuation from the 
previous day’s price. Even with its inherent advantages, this hybrid 
exchange system lasted only six days, and was replaced by a “managed 
float” system, whereby the PBOC would consider the daily changes of 
the RMB relative to the basket of currencies and enjoy full discretion in 
determining what the exchange rate would be.
34
  
Under these new systems, between 2005 and 2008, China allowed the 
value of the RMB to appreciate between 20% to 25% against the USD.
35
 
While some credit this gain to “pegging” the RMB’s value to a basket of 
currencies rather than the USD alone, others attribute this change to the 
broad-based decline in the value of the USD caused by a sharp downturn 
in the U.S. economy.
36
 However, at the beginning of the 2008 economic 
crisis, China switched back to pegging the value of the RMB to the value 
of the USD.
37
 Still, despite what currency or currencies the RMB is 
pegged to, the RMB’s value might simply be attributed to Chinese 
currency manipulation. Put another way, even if the USD is not 
depreciating against the broad basket of currencies, the USD could 
                                                                                                                       
Contagion] (“[A] country that does not protect itself against short-term hot money inflows is 
susceptible to market hysteria and thus an economic outflow.”). 
30 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 700. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 700-701. 
33  Id. at 701 (discussing the various forms or exchange rate systems, specifically, the 
differences between a fixed exchange rate, a floating exchange rate, a “crawling peg,” and a 
“managed float”). 
34 See id.  
35 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 282. 
36 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 701 (attributing the 20% to 25% appreciation in the value 
of China’s RMB directly to China’s shift in policy from a peg to the USD to a policy in which it 
loosely pegged the value of the RMB to a “basket” of major currencies that included the USD, the 
euro, and the Japanese yen; but cf. id. at 702 (attributing the RMB’s notable gains against the USD 
largely due to a broad-based decline in the value of the USD precipitated by the recent ongoing 
problems in the U.S. economy). 
37 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 282. 
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naturally depreciate against the RMB due to the huge payments 
imbalance between China and the United States. If this is the case, then 
the depreciation of the USD against the RMB occurs as a result of 
China’s currency regime.  
Once again, amid growing international pressure over the 
undervaluation of its currency, China announced in June 2010 that it was 
removing the RMB’s peg to the USD in favor of the previous “managed 
float” exchange system, however, as of September 10, 2010, the value of 
the RMB had risen by less than 1%.
38
 Many U.S. experts believe that the 
market currently undervalues the RMB by 15% to 40%.
39
  
B.   Legal/Political Solutions to Chinese Currency Manipulation 
1.   WTO/GATT 
a.   GATT Article XV 
 
As China and the United States are both members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the United States could pursue its case against 
China regarding currency manipulation through application of the 
WTO’s governing rules, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).  
Specifically, many scholars have focused on the possibility of using 
Article XV of the GATT.
40
 Article XV, which deals with exchange rates 
between two or more countries, states in relevant part: "Contracting 
parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions 
of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
41
  
                                                     
38  See Andrew Batson, China Eases Currency Peg, THE WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704365204575317854181814956.html.  
39  See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-05-351, International Trade: Treasury 
Assessments Have Not Found Currency Manipulation, But Concerns About Exchange Rates 
Continue 22 (2005) [hereinafter GAO Report] (explaining that in the studies the Accountability 
Office had reviewed, all of which had utilized the External Balance approach, which is based on 
calculating an exchange rate that would result in a country achieving a sustainable balance in its 
external accounts, such as its current account balance or its trade balance, this approach generally 
produced estimates of currency undervaluation for China from 4% to 25%, with one estimate of 
40%); see also Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 704 (noting that even among the critics of Chinese 
currency policy, “there seems to be no consensus as to how much the renminbi is undervalued,” with 
one expert estimating the RMB to be undervalued by 40%, the Institute for International Economics 
believing the RMB to be undervalued by approximately 15% to 25%, Goldman Sachs Research 
Group placing the undervaluation at about 9.5% to 15%, and yet another expert estimating that the 
RMB was undervalued by as much as 35% in 2000); see also Mihalakas, supra note 18 (noting that 
many U.S. experts believe that the RMB is 25% to 40% undervalued). 
40 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 725; see also Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is 
China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime Under the Current 
International Legal Framework, 43 INT’L LAW. 1257, 1285 (2009); see also Pettis, supra note 6, at 
287; see also Lou, supra note 14, at 475. 
41  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XV(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 6 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].  
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Furthermore, Article XV, section 2 states: 
In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
are called upon to consider or deal with problems 
concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or 
foreign exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully 
with the International Monetary Fund. In such 
consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall 
accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented 
by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary 
reserves and balances of payments . . . .
42
 
Based on the text, it is clear that under Article XV of the GATT, the 
IMF would act in a consulting capacity to both China and the United 
States (the “CONTRACTING PARTIES”) in a dispute brought by the 
United States against China. Under the Article, the United States would 
have to demonstrate to a dispute resolution body of the WTO that: (1) 
China’s currency manipulation is an “exchange action” under Article XV 
of the GATT; and (2) this manipulation “frustrates” the “intention” of the 
provisions of the GATT.
43
 Moreover, should the United States decide to 
file a complaint against China to the WTO under Article XV, the United 
States would have to accept as final the IMF’s decision on China’s 
currency manipulation.
44
 This risk of the United States having to abide 
by a binding decision against it might be countered by the U.S.’s 
effective veto power in the IMF, in that it has the ability to often set IMF 
policy.
45
 Even so, Article XV does not define the terms “exchange 
action” or “frustrate,” nor does it give clear guidance as to the 
“intention” of the GATT.46 Furthermore, a WTO dispute resolution panel 
has never dealt with the interpretation of Article XV, Section 4, 
indicating that there is a lack of precedent.
47
  
Still, academics have constructed possible interpretations of 
“exchange action,” “frustrates,” and “intention” within the meaning of 
the provisions of the GATT, and under these interpretations, the United 
States might have a veritable claim against China’s currency exchange 
regime under Article XV of the GATT.
48
 For example, one scholar 
                                                     
42 Id. at (2). 
43 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 288. 
44 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 725. 
45  See IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last updated Oct. 22, 
2012) (showing IMF members’ quotas and voting power, illustrating that, with 17.70% of the voting 
power, the United States is the only member that can block the supermajority of 85% required for 
major decisions). 
46 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 288. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. (reasoning that the United States should argue that the term “exchange action,” in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the root words, means in context, “the effect produced by 
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formulated a complaint by the United States against Chinese currency 
manipulation under Article XV by interpreting the meaning “exchange,” 
“action,” and “frustrate,” through the method prescribed by the 
customary rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention.
49
 By 
forming the meanings of such words based upon the ordinary meaning of 
the terms used, their context, and the object of purpose of Article XV, the 
scholar used a combination of definitions from Webster’s New World 
College Dictionary and an Ad Note of the GATT to construct an 
argument whereby the United States could complain that China’s 
currency regime is an “exchange action” that “frustrates” the “intention” 
of the provisions of the GATT.
50
 
Noting that the Ad Note is meant to further clarify the term 
“frustrate,” the scholar remarks that the Ad Note seems to suggest that 
not all violations of an Article of the GATT would frustrate the intent of 
the Articles of the GATT within the meaning of Section 4 of Article 
XV.
51
 Even though some commentators have suggested that this Ad Note 
may indicate that a violation under Article XV would further require a 
violation of a separate GATT provision, the scholar used Article II of the 
GATT and reasoned that the United States would need to demonstrate a 
breach by showing that “China’s intentional undervaluation of the RMB 
makes U.S. products 25% to 40% more expensive than they would 
otherwise be in the Chinese market and that the undervaluation has 
nullified the reduction of tariffs on U.S. goods that China had agreed to 
in its negotiated tariff schedule.”52 
                                                                                                                       
transferring a sum of money of one country for the equivalent in the money of another country” 
and/or “an action that affects the difference in value between currencies”); see also Mercurio & 
Leung, supra note 40, at 1286 (highlighting the fact that trade action and exchange action are distinct 
from each other, stating that “exchange action” relates to the currency and capital, and concerns 
matters such as currency convertibility or capital movement, and concluding that it is more 
appropriate to categorize China’s exchange regime as an exchange action because the regime 
involves a currency peg, thereby requiring policies that manage capital movement and regulate 
currency convertibility). 
49 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 288 (explaining that it is well settled in WTO case law to apply 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises to interpret relevant GATT 
Article XV terms). 
50 See id. at 287-291. 
51 See GATT, supra note 41, at Ad art. XV para. 4 (“The word ‘frustrate’ is intended to 
indicate, for example, that infringements of the letter of any Article of this Agreement by exchange 
action shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if, in practice, there is not appreciable 
departure from the intent of the Article. Thus, a contracting party which, as part of its exchange 
control operated in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
requires payment to be received for its exports in its own currency or in the currency of one or more 
members of the International Monetary Fund will not thereby be deemed to contravene Article XI or 
Article XIII. Another example would be that of a contracting party which specifies on an import 
license the country from which the goods may be imported, for the purpose not of introducing any 
additional element of discrimination in its import licensing system but of enforcing permissible 
exchange controls.”). 
52 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 290-291 (reasoning that the United States must characterize the 
intent of Article II of the GATT as either preventing duties from exceeding the concessions agreed to 
by the member state, or the broader notion that it is providing member states greater access to other 
member states’ markets); see also GATT, supra note 41, at art. II(1) (“Each contracting party shall 
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Whatever the interpretation of Article XV of the GATT, there appears 
to be a consensus among academics that a U.S. complaint against 
Chinese currency manipulation would be unsuccessful.
53
 On the other 
hand, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury) could simply 
determine that China is guilty of currency manipulation, rendering the 
U.S. complaint irrelevant. In light of the unclear wording of Article XV, 
China’s maintenance of the same exchange rate for over a decade, and 
China’s defenses that it did not “intend” to frustrate (a relatively weak 
legal defense) the provisions of the GATT, academics agree that such a 
U.S. challenge to China’s currency regime would be very difficult to 
establish and would most likely fail.
54
 Perhaps underpinning some of 
these critics’ opinions is the fear that a U.S. challenge may be seen as 
protectionist and would start a trade war with China. Furthermore, as 
noted above, there is the risk that an IMF finding that China did not 
violate Article XV of the GATT would be a final, binding determination 
by which the United States must abide.
55
 However, the risk of a binding 
determination against the United States could be disingenuous if the U.S. 
Treasury asserted significant influence over IMF governance, but to do 
so the U.S. Treasury would need the European Union on board. 
 
 
b.  Is Chinese Currency Manipulation a Subsidy Under the WTO’s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  
Many experts believe that China’s currency regime involving the 
intentional undervaluing of its currency in order to make Chinese 
products more competitive than they would otherwise be is, in effect, a 
subsidy.
56
 However, there is not a consensus as to whether China’s 
                                                                                                                       
accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that 
provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.”). 
53 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 727-728 (finding that China does have a defense because 
its interventions in the currency markets were maintained over a long period of time throughout 
periods of economic peaks and troughs, that it is unclear whether the IMF would side with the 
United States on this issue, and that the IMF has not even attempted to promulgate a timeline for 
RMB revaluation, choosing instead to allow China the freedom to move at its own pace, all leading 
to the likelihood that a U.S. complaint under GATT Article XV would be likely to fail); see also 
Mercurio & Leung, supra note 40, at 1288 (concluding that, even when analyzed under the most 
liberal definition of “frustrate,” China almost certainly does not infringe Article XV(4) because its 
exchange regime cannot be proven to be an exchange action that frustrates the intent of the GATT); 
see also Pettis, supra note 6, at 291 (highlighting the fact that neither the WTO nor the GATT 
dispute resolution bodies have interpreted Article XV and that China, as a developing country, could 
plausibly argue that it is taking these exchange actions simply to make it attractive to foreign 
investors and to ensure its competitiveness against other countries in its region, and not to frustrate 
the intent of Article II).  
54 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 291; see also Mercurio & Leung, supra note 40, at 1298-1299. 
55 See Sharobeem, supra note 15, at 725 (“Article XV requires that WTO members ‘accept all 
findings of statistical and other facts presented by the [IMF] relating to foreign exchange, monetary 
reserves and balances of payments.’”). 
56 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 292. 
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currency manipulation qualifies as a “subsidy” under the WTO’s 
narrower legal definition.
57
 The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) directly addresses the 
meaning of “subsidy.” Article 1.1 of the Agreement states that: 
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be 
deemed to exist if: 
(a) (1) there is a financial contribution by a 
government or any public body within the territory of a 
Member (referred to in this Agreement as 
“government”), i.e. where: 
  (i) a government practice involves a direct 
transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), 
potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan 
guarantees); 
  (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as 
tax credits); 
  (iii) a government provides goods or services 
other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
  (iv) a government makes payments to a funding 
mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry 
out one or more of the types of functions illustrated in (i) 
to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs 
from practices normally followed by governments; or 
(a) (2) there is any form of income or price support 
in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and  
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
58
  
In the Brazil_–_Aircraft case, the WTO Appellate Body (hereinafter 
“Appellate Body”) stated that “it considers a ‘financial contribution’ and 
a ‘benefit’ as two separate legal elements which together determine 
whether a subsidy exists.” 59  Thus, in order to establish that China’s 
currency regime constitutes a “subsidy” under the SCM Agreement, the 
United States must establish that China’s currency manipulation 
“includes both a financial contribution and a benefit.”60  
In the US – Softwood Lumber III case, the Dispute Resolution Panel 
clarified the meaning of “financial contribution” under Article 1.1(a)(1) 
                                                     
57 See id.  
58 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter 
SCM Agreement]. 
59 Pettis, supra note 6, at 292. 
60 Id.  
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of the SCM Agreement, declaring that “a financial contribution can exist 
not only when there is an act or an omission involving the transfer of 
money, but also in case goods or certain services are provided by the 
government.”61  Under such an interpretation, the United States could 
argue that the Chinese government’s conversion of foreign currency at a 
fixed rate qualifies as a service or as a transfer of money after the fact.
62
 
Furthermore, the United States could contend that Chinese exporters are 
receiving a free service, since after selling their products abroad they 
exchange USDs for RMB through the Chinese government without a 
fee.
63
 Alternatively, the United States should argue that the Chinese 
government is directly transferring funds to the exporter after its products 
are sold, arguably giving the exporter 25% to 40% more RMB than the 
exchanged USDs are worth.
64
  
In the Canada – Aircraft case, the Appellate Body addressed the term 
“benefit” under Article 1.1(b), stating that “a financial contribution will 
only confer a ‘benefit’, i.e., an advantage, if it is provided on terms that 
are more advantageous than those that would have been available to the 
recipient on the market.”65 Under this definition, it should be relatively 
easy for the United States to argue that the Chinese government placed 
its exporters at an advantage by giving them something of value (cash) 
and that the exporters are better off than they otherwise would be if they 
had to exchange their USDs for RMB in an open foreign exchange 
market.
66
 
Having established that China is giving a subsidy to its exporters 
under the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, the United 
States can next show that China’s distribution of subsidies falls under the 
types of subsidies that are per se prohibited under the SCM Agreement.
67
 
Article 3 identifies those subsidies that are per se prohibited under the 
SCM Agreement, stating that: 
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning 
of Article I, shall be prohibited: 
                                                     
61 Id. at 293; see also Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect 
to Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada, WT/DS236/R (Sep. 27, 2002), P 7.24. 
62 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 293.  
63 See id. at 292 (reasoning that if the Chinese exporter were able to exchange the resulting 
dollars for RMB on the open market, the entity facilitating the exchange would charge the exporter a 
fee for its services). 
64 See id. (reasoning that this fact could possibly be characterized as a transfer of money from 
the government to the exporter). 
65 Id. at 294; see also Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, 149, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). 
66 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 294. 
67 See id. 
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 (a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether 
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export 
performance . . . 
 (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of 
several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods. 
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain 
subsidies referred to in paragraph.
68
 
Footnote 4 of Article 3 explains further,  
This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that 
the granting of a subsidy, without having been made 
legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact 
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export 
earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to 
enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone 
be considered to be an export subsidy within the 
meaning of this provision.
69
 
The United States should argue that the Chinese subsidy, in the form 
of currency undervaluation, is export contingent by using the Appellate 
Body’s holding from the WTO case of United States – Tax Treatment.70 
In that case, “the Appellate Body held that the US' extraterritorial income 
tax regime constituted a countervailable subsidy despite the fact that the 
tax exemption was available for goods produced in the US and for goods 
produced outside of the US because it overwhelmingly benefited US 
exporters.”71  Furthermore, the Appellate Body in the United States – 
Upland Cotton case held “that a U.S. subsidy was export contingent even 
though it was also available to domestic users of cotton.”72  
Regarding China’s currency regime, the facts show that at least 70% 
of the subsidy goes to exporting companies.
73
 Consequently, even though 
the subsidy is available to tourists and foreign investors, the United 
States could claim that the subsidy is export contingent and is thus 
prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.
74
 Put another way, 
even though the subsidy is available to U.S. tourists, the benefit to 
tourists goes directly back to the Chinese tourism industry and is 
                                                     
68SCM Agreement, supra note 58, at art. 3. 
69 Id. 
70 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 295; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax 
Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, E-2, WT/DS108/AB/R (Jan. 14, 2002). 
71 Pettis, supra note 6, at 295. 
72 Id.; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 101, 
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005). 
73 Pettis, supra note 6, at 295. 
74 See id. 
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therefore prohibited. Further, the fact that a subsidy is available to 
foreign investors gives such investments in China a competitive price 
advantage, thereby conferring a benefit to Chinese exporters.
75
  
2.   IMF Articles of Agreement 
First drafted at Bretton Woods in 1944, in recognition that the 
exchange rates and currency value policies of one country can have 
serious effects on the interests of other countries, the IMF Articles of 
Agreement are the most important tool of international monetary law and 
practices.
76
 Article IV and the scarce currency clause focus specifically 
on currency manipulation.
77
  
a. Article IV 
 
The Second Amendment to the Articles, implemented in 1978, 
incorporated the current version of Article IV into the IMF Articles.
78
 
 
Section 1 of Article IV states that the IMF was formed to “provide a 
framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services and capital 
among countries, sustain[] sound economic growth, and continue[] the 
development of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for 
the financial and economic stability of each member state.”79 Article IV 
also charges the IMF with firm surveillance over the exchange rate 
policies of each member.
80
 Therefore, the IMF has an affirmative 
mandate over China’s valuation of the RMB.81 
Article IV, Section 1, subsection (iii) states that each member shall 
“avoid manipulating exchange rates . . . in order to prevent effective 
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members.”82 However, nowhere in the Articles of 
Agreement is “manipulating exchange rates” defined.83 Fortunately, the 
IMF Executive Board’s 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance (2007 
Decision) provides guidance as to what may constitute the manipulation 
                                                     
75 See id. 
76 See Mercurio & Leung, supra note 40, at 1270. 
77 See id. at 1273. 
78 See id. at 1271 (stating that the amended version of Article IV reflects a shift in objective 
from achieving a stable exchange rate to achieving a stable exchange rate system). 
79 Pettis, supra note 6, at 285; see also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF]. 
80 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 285. 
81 See id. 
82 Id.; see also IMF, supra note 79, at art. IV §1(iii). 
83 See Pettis, supra note 6, at 285. 
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of exchange rates.
84
 According to the 2007 Decision, possible indicators 
of exchange rate manipulation are:  
(i) protracted large-scale intervention in one direction 
in the exchange market; 
(ii) official or quasi-official borrowing that either is 
unsustainable or brings unduly high liquidity risks, or 
excessive and prolonged official or quasi-official 
accumulation of foreign assets, for balance of payment 
purposes; 
(iii) (a) the introduction, substantial intensification, or 
prolonged maintenance, for balance of payment 
purposes, of restrictions on, or incentives for, current 
transactions or payments, or 
  (b) the introduction or substantial modification for 
balance of payments purposes of restrictions on, or 
incentives for, the inflow or outflow of capital; 
(iv) the pursuit, for balance of payments purposes, of 
monetary and other financial policies that provide 
abnormal encouragement or discouragement to capital 
flows; 
(v) fundamental exchange rate misalignment; 
(vi) large and prolonged current account deficits or 
surpluses; and 
(vii) large external sector vulnerabilities, including 
liquidity risks, arising from private capital flows.
85
 
Because China has taken action to devalue the RMB since 2001 (the 
year China entered the WTO), has purchased in excess of $2.2 trillion in 
foreign exchange reserves, and has maintained a trade surplus in the 
billions of dollars with the United States, the United States should argue 
that: 1) a protracted large-scale intervention in the exchange market to 
suppress the value of the RMB was carried out by China; 2) an excessive 
and prolonged official Chinese accumulation of US dollars, for balance 
of payments purposes; 3) a fundamental exchange rate misalignment of 
China's currency; and/or 4) a large and prolonged current account 
surpluses with regard to trade with the United States.
86
  
Furthermore, section 2 of the Annex of the 2007 Decision states the 
following: “A member would only be acting inconsistently with Article 
IV, Section 1(iii) if the Fund determined both that: (a) the member was 
                                                     
84 See id.; see also IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance Over 
Members’ Policies, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm [hereinafter IMF Decision]. 
85 Pettis, supra note 6, at 285-286; see also IMF Decision, supra note 84. 
86 Pettis, supra note 6, at 286. 
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manipulating its exchange rate or the international monetary system and 
(b) such manipulation was being carried out for one of the two purposes 
specifically identified in Article IV, Section 1(iii).”87 
The Board also stated, “‘[m]anipulation’ of the exchange rate is only 
carried out through policies that are targeted at—and actually affect—the 
level of an exchange rate.”88  
The Board explained that: 
(b) A member that is manipulating its exchange rate 
would only be acting inconsistently with Article IV, 
Section 1(iii) if the Fund were to determine that such 
manipulation was being undertaken “in order to prevent 
effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an 
unfair competitive advantage over other members if the 
Fund determines that: (A) the member is engaged in 
these policies for the purpose of securing fundamental 
exchange rate misalignment in the form of an 
undervalued exchange rate and (B) the purpose of 
securing such misalignment is to increase net exports.
89
 
It should not be difficult, based on the facts, for the United States to 
argue that China’s currency regime is “targeted at and actually affect[s] 
the level of the exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the RMB.”90 
The circumstances also support the contention “that China has 
intentionally kept the value of the RMB low in order to unfairly increase 
the competitiveness of its exports.”91 
However, the IMF requirement that China had “intent to gain an 
unfair competitive advantage,” is a nearly impossible subjective standard 
to establish because it would be “politically . . . delicate for the IMF to 
officially find one of its members in breach of that provision.”92 Perhaps 
through more emphasis on bilateral or multilateral political cooperation 
within the IMF, the United States and its trade allies would be able to 
find the requisite intent. Additionally, if the United States was able to 
prove the relevant indicators of currency manipulation and intent under 
the 2007 Decision, the IMF would not be required to find in the United 
States’ favor because the relevant sections of the 2007 Decision are not 
binding.
93
 Moreover, even if the Executive Board of the IMF found in 
favor of the United States and deemed China to be engaging in currency 
                                                     
87 Id.; see also IMF Decision, supra note 84. 
88 Pettis, supra note 6, at 286. 
89 Id. at 286-287. 
90 Id. at 287. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 285, 287. 
93 See id. at 287. 
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manipulation, the decision would be unenforceable because the IMF 
Agreement lacks a procedure for dispute resolution.
94
  
b. Article VII: The Scarce Currency Clause 
 
i. The Scarce Currency Clause: The Text.  Article VII, section 3, of the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement contains the rule regarding scarce currency. 
In relevant part, it states: 
Section 3. Scarcity of the Fund’s holdings 
(a) If it becomes evident to the Fund that the demand 
for a member’s currency seriously threatens the Fund’s 
ability to supply that currency, the Fund, whether or not 
it has issued a report under Section 2 of this Article, 
shall formally declare such currency scarce and shall 
thenceforth apportion its existing and accruing supply of 
the scarce currency with due regard to the relative needs 
of members, the general international economic 
situation, and any other pertinent considerations. The 
Fund shall issue a report concerning its action. 
 
(b) A formal declaration under (a) above shall operate 
as an authorization to any member, after consultation 
with the Fund, temporarily to impose limitations on the 
freedom of exchange of operations in the scarce 
currency. Subject to the provisions of Article IV and 
Schedule C, the member shall have complete jurisdiction 
in determining the nature of such limitations, but they 
shall be no more restrictive than is necessary to limit the 
demand for the scarce currency to the supply held by, or 
accruing to, the member in question, and they shall be 
relaxed and removed as rapidly as conditions permit. 
(c) The authorization under (b) above shall expire 
whenever the Fund formally declares the currency in 
question to be no longer scarce.
95
 
ii. The Scarce Currency Clause: Analysis.  Despite the IMF’s lack of a 
dispute resolution mechanism, the possibility of utilizing the “scarce 
currency clause” of the IMF Articles of Agreement remains. The scarce 
currency clause would allow the IMF “to declare a currency scarce if an 
excess demand for it was manifest in the Fund exhausting its supplies, 
whereupon debtor countries would be entitled to discriminate against 
                                                     
94 See id. 
95 IMF, supra note 79, at art. VII §3.  
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payments to the country whose currency has been declared scarce.”96 
Although the clause has never been invoked, if properly applied to 
China’s currency manipulation and its concomitant chronic trade 
surpluses with the United States, the international trade community could 
effectively encourage China to bear the burden of adjustment, that is, 
make China open its markets to deficit countries and recycle its surpluses 
through outright grants.
97
 In fact, in late 2010, U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner planned to reveal the possibility of pursuing action 
against China through this very channel.
98
 
Since the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, and throughout the IMF’s 
existence, the IMF has consistently placed the burden of adjustment 
completely on deficit countries.
99
 This practice was not what some of the 
IMF’s founders, including renowned British economist John Maynard 
Keynes, envisioned.
100
 Keynes proposed the establishment of an 
International Clearing Union that would assess interest penalties on 
excess reserves above a country’s quota.101 Keynes believed that putting 
the burden entirely on the deficit countries would undermine activity and 
world commerce.
102
 
                                                     
96 John Williamson, Getting Surplus Countries to Adjust, PETERSEN INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 
(Nov. 19, 2012, 10:35 PM), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb11-01.pdf. 
97  See The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, at 1642 (“The IMF took a ‘highly 
asymmetrical’ approach to adjustment by placing the major burden of policy change and adjustment 
on deficit countries. But that a credible threat to effectively use the scarce currency clause might 
pressure a surplus country to recycle its reserves to deficit countries.”); see also Timothy A. Canova, 
Financial Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order, and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1317-1318 (2000) [hereinafter Financial Liberalization] (arguing that the 
“scarce currency clause” and Article 12 of the WTO should be utilized “to encourage surplus 
countries to open their markets to deficit countries and to recycle their surpluses through outright 
grants” a practice that was successful during the Marshall Plan after World War II); see also Arvind 
Subramanian, Imbalances and undervalued exchange rates: Rehabilitating Keynes, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2008, 2:16 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2008/11/imbalances-and-
undervalued-exchange-rates-rehabilitating-keynes/#axzz1eBLQimhK (stating that Keynes was 
obsessed with getting countries with persistent current account surpluses to adjust because he was 
acutely aware of the limited leverage that could be exerted against such countries, thus calling for 
the rehabilitation of Keynes’s “scarce currency clause” by adapting it to today’s institutional 
realities). 
98 See Joe Weisenthal, Tim Geithner Says There’s An Old IMF Rule He Can Invoke To Punish 
China Over The Yuan, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Oct. 6, 2010), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2 
010-10-06/markets/30049563_1_currencies-economies-countries (reporting on an apparent speech 
made by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner at the Brookings Institute, in which Geithner expresses 
the administration’s growing frustration with China and hints at the possibility of pursuing action 
under the “scarce currency clause” of the IMF Articles of Agreement); see also The Path to Global 
Recovery: A Conversation with Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 
6, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/10/06-global-recovery#ref-id=1006_global_recove 
ry_geithner1) (Geithner’s ultimate speech, while reported to have hinted at possible use of the 
“scarce currency clause” actually omitted the relevant language). 
99  See The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, at 1637-1638. 
100 See id. at 1637. 
101 See id. 
102  See id. (“Keynes claimed that the International Clearing Union plan would pressure 
adjustment on ‘any country whose balance of payments with the rest of the world is departing from 
equilibrium in either direction.’”). 
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 Keynes would have envisioned assessing high interest penalties on 
China’s excessive reserves, putting the ultimate burden on China, as a 
large surplus country.  This would encourage China to open its markets 
to deficit countries, like the United States, and use its surpluses to make 
outright grants to such deficit countries.  Keynes would fundamentally 
disagree with the current situation, which places the burden on countries 
carrying trade deficits against large surplus countries like China. 
Unfortunately, Keynes’ fears have come true, with a notable example 
coming in the form of the IMF’s handling of Mexico’s 1982 debt 
crisis.
103
 The IMF conditioned its financial aid to Mexico on the adoption 
of a classic austerity program whereby the government deflates its 
economy by raising interest rates, constraining the growth of the money 
supply, cutting back on government spending, and raising taxes, thereby 
providing a classic example of the IMF’s policy of placing the entire 
burden of adjustment on a deficit country.
104
 Mexico’s policy, 
conditioned by the IMF, opened the door to “highly liquid” capital 
inflows, or “hot money,” laying the groundwork for a major currency 
crisis.
105
 
Upon increasingly negative investor speculation and domestic 
political instability, the “hot money” fled the country and the peso 
dropped in value by 50% in 1995.
106
 In response, Mexico adopted yet 
another IMF Stabilization Program in 1995, re-introducing many of the 
same policies that had caused their situation in the first place.
107
 Both the 
IMF’s policy of placing the burden on the deficit country after the onset 
of crisis and its mandated goals of currency regime stabilization and 
trade liberalization created the perfect conditions for a currency crisis 
within Mexico’s economy. This crisis had serious “adverse effects for its 
citizens in terms of purchasing power, cost of living, and internal 
                                                     
103 See Chantal Thomas, Finance and the International Trading Regime: Rules, Theory and 
Practice on Balance-of-Payments Crises and the Structural and Substantive Implications of a Shift 
to the ‘Geneva Consensus’, U. Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2005), http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/_7/kP/_ 
7kPRWOZwGQJKKlwQVf5Qw/wto-thomas.pdf; see also The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, 
at 1572. 
104 See The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, at 1638; see also Thomas, supra note 103, at 
16-17 (“Under the IMF Stabilization Program of 1982, Mexico pursued the reforms that would come 
to form the three pillars of the Washington Consensus: privatization and fiscal austerity, each part of 
the overall goal of ‘budget consolidation’ and trade liberalization….[E]xchange rate management 
was always a central aspect of the stabilization programs of the IMF.”).  
105 See The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, at 1585 (discussing the short-term capital 
inflows, or “hot money,” that quickly fled following the 1994-95 currency panic and had deep 
implications on the Mexican economy); see also Thomas, supra note 103, at 18 (noting that the 
capital inflows increased liquidity, and were viewed cautiously by observers given the trade deficit). 
106 See Thomas, supra note 103, at 18. 
107 See id. at 19 (“The features of this stabilization program repeated many of the prior tenets, 
introducing the following measures: an immediate cut in across-the-board government spending of 
10 per cent, immediate increases of 35 per cent in petroleum prices and 20 per cent in electricity 
prices; increases in the value-added tax; and a dramatic decrease in the money supply, leading short-
term interest rates to more than 40 per cent.”). 
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economic stability.” 108  In addition, a rising surge of migration from 
Mexico into the United States at this time has been largely attributed to 
this failed economic experiment.
109
 
One can find a much more mutually beneficial approach in addressing 
the imbalance in trade between China and the United States by revisiting 
the United States’ implementation of the Marshall Plan following World 
War II.
110
 Under the Marshall Plan, the United States “recycled” its 
surplus by giving $13 billion (roughly $130 billion in 2012) in foreign 
aid over four years (1947 through 1951) to Western European countries 
to rebuild their economies.
111
 Western Europe used those funds to 
purchase U.S. products and to pay U.S. construction companies, 
effectively rebuilding Western European economies, while also 
sustaining demand in the U.S. economy.
112
 Indeed, the Marshall Plan 
provides a perfect example of how placing the burden of adjustment on 
the surplus country can be beneficial for those involved.  
Applying this practice to the balance of payments crisis between 
China and the United States, the United States, through the IMF, should 
invoke the “scarce currency clause”, effectively placing the burden of 
adjustment on China.  Although no one has ever invoked this clause, the 
deepening payments imbalance crisis between China and the United 
States, and its global implications, provide the credible threat needed to 
pursue this route.
113
  Under the clause, the IMF is permitted “to identify a 
chronic surplus country, declare its currency as a scarce currency, and 
allow the rest of the world to discriminate against that country’s imports” 
via restrictions on current transactions.
114
 Used in conjunction with 
Article XII of the GATT, “[i]n order to safeguard its external financial 
position and achieve full employment, a contracting party ‘may restrict 
the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported.’”115 In 
this way, international trade law could motivate chronic surplus 
countries, such as China, to bear the burden of adjustment, as originally 
envisioned by Keynes.
116
  
As mentioned above, there are still questions about the IMF’s ability 
to enforce its decisions, as it lacks an enforcement mechanism.
117
 The 
enforcement question may best be addressed through the use of the 
                                                     
108 Id. 
109 See id.  
110 See The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, at 1638. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 1641. 
113 See id. at 1642 (“[A] credible threat to effectively use the scarce currency clause might 
pressure a surplus country to recycle its reserves to deficit countries.”). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1643. 
116 See id. 
117 Pettis, supra note 6, at 287. 
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WTO’s dispute resolution process. 118  Through the so-called “Geneva 
Consensus,” the WTO, with the IMF’s guidance, could act as the body of 
enforcement, and exert pressure on China to bear the burden of 
adjustment by recycling its surplus to deficit countries, including the 
United States, while recognizing China’s right to political autonomy in 
other areas of trade.
119
  Such a change would be consistent with the 
WTO’s better record of enforcement and the overall perception that the 
WTO is a more effective and legitimate body than the IMF.
120
 
3. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Trade Act) 
was passed by the U.S. Congress “[i]n response to earlier concerns 
regarding exchange rate policies of certain Asian countries and their 
trade with the United States and the world . . . .” 121  While such 
Congressional Acts are plausible mechanisms by which the United States 
could confront China’s currency regime, their effectiveness is limited by 
their inherently unilateral nature. The additional leverage provided by a 
multilateral approach (i.e., the IMF), in which the U.S. acts alongside 
other countries affected by China’s undervaluation of the RMB, would 
likely prove to more effective.
122
   
The Trade Act’s applicable law states that:  
The Secretary of the Treasury shall analyze on an 
annual basis the exchange rate policies of foreign 
countries, in consultation with the International 
Monetary Fund, and consider whether countries 
manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency 
and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing 
effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining 
unfair competitive advantage in international trade. If the 
                                                     
118 See Thomas, supra note 103, at 26 (arguing in favor of the flexibility offered by the Geneva 
Consensus and concluding that the Geneva Consensus might help to promote liberalization projects 
in developing countries); see also Subramanian, supra note 97 (“What is needed is a rule in the 
WTO proscribing undervalued exchange rates that are clearly attributable to government action. An 
undervalued exchange rate is in effect a combination of export subsidies and import tariffs, each of 
which is currently disciplined by the WTO. The IMF would continue to be the sole forum for broad 
exchange rate surveillance. But in those rare instances of undervaluation, we envisage a more 
effective delineation of responsibility, with the IMF continuing to play a technical role in assessing 
when a country’s exchange rate was undervalued, and the WTO assuming the enforcement role.”). 
119 See The Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 29, at 1638. 
120 See Subramanian, supra note 97 (reasoning that such a rule could be incorporated in the 
WTO through negotiation and by calling on a number of developing countries (Brazil, Mexico, 
Turkey, and South Africa) recently affected by an undervalued RMB to join in multilateral 
negotiations alongside the United States and the European Union with China, while addressing 
Chinese concerns, as the approach that has been taken for the past sixty years has failed). 
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Secretary considers that such manipulation is occurring 
with respect to countries that (1) have material global 
current account surpluses; and (2) have significant 
bilateral trade surpluses with the United States, the 
Secretary of the Treasury shall take action to initiate 
negotiations with such foreign countries on an expedited 
basis, in the International Monetary Fund or bilaterally, 
for the purposes of ensuring that such countries regularly 
and promptly adjust the rate of exchange between their 
currencies and the United States dollar to permit 
effective balance of payments adjustments and to 
eliminate the unfair advantage. The Secretary shall not 
be required to initiate negotiations in cases where such 
negotiations would have a serious detrimental impact on 
vital national economic and security interests; in such 
cases, the Secretary shall inform the chairman and the 
ranking minority member of the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and of the 
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs of 
the House of Representatives of his determination.
123
 
Some view the Trade Act as an ineffective tool in addressing China’s 
currency manipulation. For example, in a 2005 Congressional Committee 
Report, the committee found that the U.S. Treasury enjoys “significant 
flexibility in making its determinations, including determining the intent 
of any manipulation.”124 The report indicated that U.S. Treasury officials 
“do not make an official determination of undervaluation as a part of 
their manipulation assessments although, according to their March 2005 
report to Congress, they do consider measures of undervaluation.”125 
Ultimately, the Congressional Committee Report concluded that “[g]iven 
its broad approach to impact-related analysis, Treasury’s semiannual 
reports do not contain discrete examinations of the effect on the U.S. 
economy of changes in the dollar’s value.”126 Therefore, the “Treasury’s 
reports do not specifically address the impact of the dollar on aspects of 
economic activity listed in the . . . Trade Act, including production, 
employment, and global industrial competition.” 127  Instead, U.S. 
Treasury officials stated “that China did not meet the Trade Act’s 
definition for currency manipulation for the purposes of Treasury’s 2003 
and 2004 assessments, in part because it did not have a material global 
current account surplus and had maintained a fixed exchange rate regime 
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since 1994 through different economic conditions.”128  While the U.S. 
Treasury did not report data on China’s global current account surplus 
from mid-2003 to mid- 2004, “Treasury officials stated that the surplus 
had not reached a material level.”129 
It is not surprising that the U.S. Treasury has not found China to have 
a “material” global current account surplus or a “significant” bilateral 
trade surplus with the United States, or that China is manipulating their 
currency with the intent of gaining a trade advantage, given that Treasury 
officials enjoy significant discretion in determining intent.
130
 Treasury 
officials admitted that they “do not have operational definitions of a 
‘material’ global current account surplus or a ‘significant’ bilateral trade 
surplus.”131 Moreover, the law requires that the country alleged to be 
partaking in currency manipulation carry a material global current 
account surplus.
132
 However, this requirement ignores the fact that the 
global current account balance is generally closer to equilibrium than the 
current account balance with any one country, a fact well illustrated by 
the U.S.-China trade imbalance.
133
 Even so, China carries the second 
largest current account surplus in the world, an estimated $201.7 billion 
in 2011.
134
 Thus, demonstrating that China has a “material” global 
current account surplus.
135
 The second requirement under the Trade Act 
is evident from looking at the data, which clearly illustrates China’s 
significant bilateral trade surpluses with the United States.
136
 
Accordingly, there is ample evidence that China is manipulating its 
currency; however, the U.S. Treasury has consistently failed to find a 
violation.  
For the aforementioned reasons, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 is not a legitimate mechanism by which the 
United States may successfully claim that China’s currency regime is an 
exercise of currency manipulation. Despite the U.S. Treasury’s wide 
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discretion to define crucial terms and to determine intent, there has not 
been an official decision that China has manipulated its currency. 
Perhaps, with enough pressure from Congress, the White House 
administration will finally feel compelled to make the requisite 
modifications in order to label China as a currency manipulator. 
4. Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 
On Tuesday, October 11, 2011, the U.S. Senate voted 63-35 to 
impose new duties on imports from nations whose currency is 
undervalued, targeting China’s management of the RMB and its negative 
effects on the U.S. economy.
137
 The bill, called the “Currency Exchange 
Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011,” was intended to force the White 
House to be more aggressive in seeking tariffs and other penalties against 
countries with “misaligned” currencies. 138  While the bill’s future is 
uncertain, the Senate debate has kept the public’s focus on China’s 
currency manipulation.
139
  
Official Chinese reaction was immediate.
140
 According to one 
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, “[t]his bill seriously violates 
World Trade Organization rules, harms bilateral economic and trade 
cooperation, and does not solve the economic and employment problems 
in the United States.”141 Likewise, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesperson, Ma Zhaoxu stated “[t]he passing of the act, under the 
pretext of so-called ‘currency imbalance,’ is a protectionist measure in 
[sic] nature, which severely violates the WTO rules . . . . Not only will it 
fail to solve the economic and employment problems in the U.S., but it 
will severely obstruct China-U.S. economic relations and trade.”142  
Despite wide support for the bill in the U.S. House of Representatives 
(House), Republican House leaders are not interested in scheduling a 
vote.
143
 House Speaker John Boehner considers the bill dangerous.
144
 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor stated the House would not make a decision 
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on the bill until the White House chooses a position, something that the 
White House has been reluctant to formally do.
145
 President Barack 
Obama’s administration accused China of currency manipulation and 
playing the trade market, but has also expressed concern over the 
consequences the bill might have on U.S. obligations in China.
146
 
President Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the RMB’s appreciation, but 
given the expected change in leadership in Beijing next year, U.S. 
officials recognize that Chinese officials are unlikely to make any 
substantial changes from current practice.
147
  
While Republican House leaders have expressed their skepticism 
about the prospect of the bill coming up for a vote in the House, 
notwithstanding the fact that fifteen of the sixty-three Senators to vote 
for the Senate bill were Republicans, there also appears to be sufficient 
Republican support in the House of Representatives.
148
 While House 
Speaker John Boehner does have the power to block the bill, the bill’s 
proponents claim they have enough support to pass the bill if it came to a 
vote.
149
 Even if the House were to pass the bill, the final decision would 
rest with President Obama and because the bill’s passage could result in 
a trade war with China, the President would have a difficult choice on his 
hands.
150
  
As passed by the Senate, the bill would: “[1] [F]orce the 
administration to . . . red-flag nations whose currencies are undervalued 
for long periods . . . . [2] Make it tougher for the U.S. Department of 
Commerce to ignore calls to investigate accusations of undervalued 
currencies. [3] Force the White House to give Congress a list of nations 
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with ‘misaligned’ currencies.”151  If, after being accused of having an 
undervalued currency, a nation does not make sufficient effort to 
rebalance the currency for three months or more, then tariffs are imposed 
on the nation’s imports into the United States.152 In addition, the bill 
would prevent the government from buying goods and services from the 
violating nation, and prevent various agencies and corporations from 
investing in the violating nation.
153
 Furthermore, the bill allows currency 
undervaluation to potentially be considered a “countervailable subsidy” 
under the Tariff Act of 1930.
154
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The range of political and legal remedies to counter China’s currency 
manipulation is compelling, but none have proven to be effective to date. 
By pegging the RMB to the USD, China is manipulating its currency—
giving its exporters an unfair price advantage to the detriment of U.S. 
exporters and the U.S. economy as a whole. This has wiped out a large 
segment of U.S. manufacturing jobs and resulted in large and chronic 
Chinese trade surpluses with the United States. 
On an international level, the WTO has a better track record of 
enforcement of its decisions than the IMF, largely due to the fact that the 
IMF lacks any independent enforcement mechanism. Under either 
regime, there exist tools to impose sanctions on China for its 
manipulation of the RMB. Through the so-called “Geneva Consensus,” 
the WTO, with the IMF’s guidance, could act as the enforcement body, 
and exert pressure on China to bear the burden of adjustment by 
recycling its surpluses to deficit countries, including the United States, 
while recognizing China’s right to political autonomy in other areas of 
trade.
155
  
Domestically, critics who make any effort to label China as a 
currency manipulator fear the political repercussions and the possibility 
of a trade war between the United States and China. Yet, these same 
critics fail to see that the United States is already in a trade war, and 
China is winning. China holds one of the largest trade surpluses in the 
world, while the United States holds the largest trade deficit.
156
 
Furthermore, the United States is experiencing unemployment levels not 
seen since the Great Depression.
157
 Many of our elected representatives 
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have recognized that these facts have not occurred by mere coincidence, 
but rather are inextricably linked to the U.S.-China trade imbalance. This 
has led to the passage of legislation, such as the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988. Despite the promises of the Trade Act to 
address the issues of currency manipulation and bilateral trade surpluses 
with the United States, the Trade Act has largely failed because of 
unwillingness by successive administrations to follow Congressional 
intent in enacting it.  
Congress’ frustration has led to the Senate passing the Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 (Oversight Act). If passed 
by the House and signed by the President, this would impose more 
stringent requirements on the U.S. Treasury in addressing cases of 
currency manipulation and make it harder to simply skirt the problem, as 
has been the practice to date. There is a very real possibility that the 
Oversight Act will pass the House and make it to President Obama’s 
desk. Should this happen, the question remains whether President Obama 
will sign it and risk angering China or refuse to sign it and lose political 
points with constituents from America’s manufacturing sector. While 
avoiding big issues in election years is a trademark of our American 
political system, a recent Presidential candidate has put Chinese currency 
manipulation at the forefront. Republican Presidential candidate Mitt 
Romney promised that he would label China as a currency manipulator 
in his first day in office, and that he would impose tariffs on Chinese 
imports to the United States that are being subsidized by the 
manipulation.
158
 Yet, we will not get to see Mitt Romney fulfill his 
promise, Barack Obama having won his second term in November 2012.  
Whether or not this is mere political posturing, it is clear that the political 
conversation regarding Chinese currency manipulation has come to the 
forefront. 
Considering all the approaches discussed above, the practice of 
imposing the burden of adjustment on the surplus country, as proposed 
by Keynes, seems the most compelling approach to our current 
predicament. The Marshall Plan provides an example of how such a 
practice can be mutually beneficial to all involved.
159
 This approach 
would best be achieved by invoking the “scarce currency clause” of the 
IMF Articles of Agreement. Under the clause, the IMF could identify 
China as a chronic surplus country, declare the RMB as a scarce 
currency, and allow the rest of the world to discriminate against China’s 
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imports via restrictions on current transactions.
160
 In this way, the IMF 
would be acting within its purview and honoring Keynes’ vision. 
Critics cite the IMF’s unwillingness to impose strict timelines on 
China’s adjustment of RMB valuation, the IMF’s lack of enforcement 
mechanism, and the fact that the “scarce currency clause” has never been 
invoked. Yet, there is reason to be guardedly optimistic with the 
possibility of a successful U.S. claim that China has violated the “scarce 
currency clause.” Not only does the U.S. Treasury play a large role in the 
policy of the IMF, but the United States is the sole IMF member with the 
power to veto any negative IMF decision. Furthermore, by cooperating 
on a multilateral level with Europe and other countries affected by 
Chinese currency manipulation, the United States could increase the 
likelihood of finding a Chinese “scarce currency” violation. Finally, as 
mentioned above, by applying the “Geneva Consensus” approach, the 
WTO, with the IMF’s guidance, would provide the necessary pressure to 
finally force China to open its market to the United States, and use its 
surpluses to make grants to the United States, effectively placing the 
burden of adjustment on China. 
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